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1 Executive Summary 
 
A growing majority of climate scientists are convinced that unless emissions are reduced, 
global warming would cause a number of adverse effects throughout the United States.  
In California, rising temperatures would reduce the snow pack in the Sierra—the state’s 
primary source of  water—and lead to less water for irrigating farms in the Central 
Valley.  Global warming would increase the number of extreme heat days and greatly 
increase the risk of poor air quality across the state.  California’s 1,100 miles of coastline 
and coastal communities are vulnerable to rising sea levels.  Concerted action could curb 
global warming, but all sectors would need to take immediate steps to reduce heat-
trapping pollution.   
 
In California, the transportation sector consumes well over half the oil used statewide, 
and passenger cars and trucks emit 20 to 30 percent of the state’s global warming 
pollution.  Vehicles therefore are a central focus of the immediate action required to 
reduce global warming.   
 
The state of California’s regulatory approach involves phasing in limits to average global 
warming emissions from passenger cars and trucks beginning in 2009 and culminating in 
2016.  This regulation is often called “Pavley,” after its author, Assemblywoman Fran 
Pavley.   
 
The federal government’s approach provides tax incentives to buyers of hybrid vehicles, 
which emit significantly lower amounts of global warming pollution than most 
conventional vehicles.  However, the hybrid incentive affects only a small portion of the 
vehicle market.   
 
A third approach that could be used to enhance or replace existing regulations would be a 
feebates program. A feebates program creates a schedule of both fees and rebates that 
reflects the amount of global warming pollution that different vehicles emit.  Purchasers 
of new vehicles that emit larger amounts of heat-trapping emissions pay a one-time 
surcharge at the point of purchase. These surcharges are then used to provide rebates to 
buyers of new vehicles that emit less pollution.  A feebates program has several 
advantages over other approaches: 
 
Market-oriented: A feebates program recognizes the power of price signals to 
change consumer behavior. That is, incentives spur consumers to purchase and 
manufactures to produce cleaner vehicles.   
 
Self-financing: A feebates program can be designed so that the surcharges collected 
equal the rebates paid. 
 
Affects entire market: A feebates program applies to all new vehicles—clean and 
dirty—spurring a transformation of the entire market. 
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Consumer choice: A feebates program can be designed so that consumers have the 
option to buy vehicles that carry no surcharge in each vehicle class, such as cars, 
trucks, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), and minivans. 
 
This study explores the economic impacts on consumers and manufacturers of the 
existing Pavley regulation and a feebates program by analyzing four alternative scenarios, 
using information from 2002 as the base year.   
 
Our findings show that a feebates program is an effective strategy to reduce global 
warming pollution by up to 25% more than Pavley alone.  Also, under a feebates 
program consumers will save thousands of dollars and retailers will see their revenue 
rise by as much as 6%.   
Our Approach 
As part of the Pavley regulation, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) reviewed 
39 emission-reducing technologies. CARB then used modeling to determine how much 
pollution these technologies would actually eliminate, as well as the cost of different 
technology packages.  In our study, we created marginal cost curves for these technology 
packages to determine the cost of reducing various amounts of global warming pollution.   
 
In addition to this supply-side analysis, we also modeled how the demand for specific 
vehicles depends on how consumers value vehicle attributes, such as performance, size, 
and fuel economy. To estimate the value to consumers of reducing the heat-trapping 
emissions of vehicles, we used California market data to revise a model developed by the 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute’s (UMTRI) Automotive 
Analysis Division.   
The Feebates Program  
We also needed to define a hypothetical feebates program.  As noted, such a program 
entails charging buyers of vehicles that emit large amounts of global warming pollution 
one-time fees, which are used to provide rebates to buyers of vehicles with lower 
emissions.   
 
The graph below shows one potential feebates schedule. The horizontal axis measures the 
amount of global warming pollution that a vehicle produces in grams of carbon dioxide– 
equivalent per mile. The vertical axis measures surcharges (positive values) and rebates 
(negative values). The example schedule preserves consumer choice by incorporating a 
“zero-band”: a range of emissions levels that do not require surcharges on vehicles that 
fall within the range.   
 
A feebates program is usually defined according to the change in surcharge or rebate for 
each additional amount of pollution a vehicle produces. In Figure 1, this amount is $18 
per gram of CO2-equivalent emissions per mile. This is known as the slope of the 
feebates schedule.  The pivot point, another element defining a program, is the point on 
the schedule where it crosses the horizontal (emissions) axis. 
 
For the program shown in Figure 1, the pivot point is 250 grams per mile. Thus a vehicle 
that produces 350 grams per mile would incur a surcharge of $1,800.  As the slope of a 
feebates program increases, the incentive to reduce emissions also increases.  For 
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example, if the slope were $25 per gram per mile, the surcharge for that vehicle would be 
$2,500.   
 
The feebates program in our study has three constraints: 
 
• Surcharges and rebates are limited to $2,500. 
• The program is self-financing. 
• The zero-band—where vehicles neither incur a surcharge nor earn a rebate— 
includes 20–25 percent of the fleet. 
 
Figure 1:  Hypothetical Feebates Program with  
Slope of $18 Gram of CO2 Equivalent per Mile 
 
The Four Scenarios 
We compared four different scenarios with the 2002 baseline: 
 
Pavley alone: Each automaker meets its Pavley target. 
 
Feebates alone ($18 per gram of CO2-equivalent per mile): The feebates program 
has an $18 slope. 
 
Feebates alone ($36 per gram of CO2-equivalent per mile): The feebates program 
has a $36 slope. (This program is designed to achieve the same overall emission 
reductions as Pavley alone.) 
 
Pavley plus feebates ($18 per gram of CO2-equivalent per mile): Automakers 
meet their Pavley targets, and vehicles are subject to a feebates program with an $18 
slope. 
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Under the Pavley scenario, we assume that each automaker installs technologies on its 
vehicles to exactly meet the average fleet wide emissions required in 2016, at the lowest-
possible cost.  Under a feebates program, we assume that automakers install emission-
reducing technologies until the cost of those technologies, plus the feebates, equals the 
value to consumers (marginal cost equals marginal revenue).  That is, the prospect of 
lower fees encourages manufacturers of dirtier vehicles to make them cleaner, while the 
prospect of higher rebates encourages manufacturers of cleaner vehicles to make them 
even cleaner.  
 
We then simulated the impacts of these scenarios on the light vehicle market in 
California. We assumed that the cost of the additional technologies designed to reduce 
emissions, lower fees, and raise rebates changes the cost of the vehicles.  This, in turn, 
changes consumer demand for the vehicles and retailers’ revenue, according to UMTRI’s 
market model.  We then evaluated the impact of the four scenarios on emission 
reductions, retailers, and consumers—including lifetime savings to consumers from more 
fuel-efficient and thus cleaner vehicles.  
 
The model used a fuel price of $1.74 per gallon—the average in 2002—and a 5 percent 
discount rate, to estimate the present value of future savings to consumers.  However, the 
U.S. Department of Energy reported an average retail gasoline price of $3.30 in 
California in April 2007.  If our study had used today’s higher fuel prices, it would have 
found significantly higher demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles. Such a market shift 
would reduce emissions even further, and improve lifetime savings to consumers.   
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Results 
Reductions in Emissions 
Our study shows that a feebates program is effective in reducing global warming 
pollution from vehicles.   
 
The amount of such emission cuts depends on the slope of the feebates curve. Thus the 
reductions ranged from a market average of 17 percent under the modest feebates 
program ($18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile) to 33 percent under Pavley and 
feebates combined (see  
Table 1).  In fact:  
 
The combination of Pavley plus feebates achieves a 33% reduction in global warming 
pollution—25 percent more than Pavley alone.   
 
Table 1:  Emissions Reductions under Different Scenarios and Their Source 
 Fleet-wide 
Emissions 
(g CO2-eq/mi) 
Reduction in 
Emissions 
(g CO2-eq/mi) 
Total 
%Change 
in 
Emissions 
% Change in 
Emissions 
from 
Technology 
% Change in 
Emissions 
from Market 
Shift 
Base 352     
Pavley Only 258 -94 -26.7% 101.0% -1.0% 
Feebates Only 
($18 slope) 292 -60 -17.1% 98.2% 1.8% 
Feebates Only 
($36 slope) 258 -94 -26.7% 98.8% 1.2% 
Pavley plus 
Feebates ($18) 235 -117 -33.3% 100.1% -0.1% 
 
Emission reductions can stem from the addition of technologies by automakers, or from a market 
shift that occurs as feebates spur consumers to buy cleaner vehicles. The two right-hand columns in  
Table 1 show that at full implementation nearly all the emissions reductions in our 
scenarios come from the addition of technologies, and not from a significant change in 
the types of vehicles consumers buy.   
 
Under closer examination, the market in the two scenarios with Pavley regulations 
actually shifts a small fraction of consumers’ purchases (<2%) toward vehicles with 
higher emissions after new technologies have been applied.  This results in a change of 
emissions from technology greater than 100 percent. However, in the feebates-only 
scenarios, the market shifts toward cleaner vehicles.   
 
This is one advantage of a feebates program. Under a regulation scenario (Pavley Only) 
in our model, vehicle manufacturers install technologies on all vehicles, clean and dirty, 
to reduce global warming pollution to the required level.  The prices consumers pay to 
purchase the vehicles rise, because of the cost of the additional technologies (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2:  Effect of Regulations on Emissions and Consumer Purchase Prices 
 
However, under a feebates scenario in our model, manufacturers install technologies on 
all vehicles, clean and dirty, to reduce emissions and to reduce surcharges and increase 
rebates.  Rebates compensate consumers for some of the costs of the technologies, 
making clean vehicles less expensive (Figure 3).  Surcharges on high-polluting vehicles 
increase the cost of those vehicles even further.  This accounts for the small market shift.  
Figure 3:  Effect of Feebates Program on Emissions and Consumer Purchases 
 
More importantly:  
 
Although emission-reducing technologies raise the cost of vehicles, a feebates program 
makes cleaner vehicles more affordable to consumers.  
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1.1.1 Impact on Consumers  
The price of vehicles, including feebates, is just one aspect of how a feebates policy 
would affect consumers’ pocketbooks.  Some technologies that reduce global warming 
pollution also improve the efficiency of vehicles, thereby reducing fuel costs over their 
lifetime.  Table 2 combines retail prices with vehicle lifetime fuel savings to show the full 
impact on consumers.  
 
Under all scenarios and for all vehicle types, consumers save ( up to $2,544) over the 
lifetimes of their vehicles.  The greatest overall market savings, $1,793 is realized under 
Feebates alone with $36 per gram per mile slope.  
 
Table 2: Vehicle Lifetime Savings to Consumers under Each Scenario and Vehicle Type 
Scenario  Car Van Pickup SUV Market 
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($2,432) ($3,090) ($3,712) ($3,786) ($2,928) 
Retail Price $1,253 $989 $1,367 $1,242 $1,275 
Pavley Alone 
 Total Change ($1,178) ($2,100) ($2,344) ($2,544) ($1,652) 
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($1,428) ($2,117) ($2,456) ($2,429) ($1,892) 
Retail Price $536 $743 $959 $920 $658 
Net Feebates  ($652) $172 $1,187 $928 $0 
Feebates Alone  
($18 g per g/mi) 
Total Change ($1,544) ($1,203) ($311) ($581) ($1,234) 
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($2,281) ($3,254) ($3,812) ($3,817) ($2,957) 
Retail Price $979 $1,270 $1,633 $1,516 $1,164 
Net Feebates ($877) $235 $1,444 $1,353 $0 
Feebates Alone  
($36 g per g/mi) 
Total Change ($2,179) ($1,748) ($735) ($948) ($1,793) 
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($2,904) ($3,949) ($4,817) ($4,770) ($3,670) 
Retail Price $2,618 $2,726 $3,514 $3,227 $2,866 
Net Feebates ($541) $280 $966 $673 $0 
Pavley plus Feebates  
($18 g per g/mi) 
Total Change ($287) ($1,222) ($1,303) ($1,543) ($804) 
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1.1.2 Impact on Retailers  
We also examined the impact of the different scenarios on retailers. Although sales 
decline no more than 4 percent because of higher costs stemming from additional 
technology:  
 
Retailers’ revenue rises under all scenarios, and the feebates program boosts the sale of 
cleaner vehicles.  
 
 
Table 3:  Retailers’ Revenue under Different Scenarios 
 Retailers’ 
Revenue 
($ Billions) 
Revenue 
Change from 
Base 
($ Billions) 
% Change 
Revenue from 
Base 
Base 
 
$52.2   
Pavley Only 
 
$54.9 $2.8 5.3% 
Feebates Only 
($18 slope) 
$53.2 $1.1 2.1% 
Feebates Only 
($36 slope) 
$54.1 $1.9 3.7% 
Pavley plus 
Feebates ($18) 
$55.7 $3.5 6.7% 
 
Overall, while policy designers can adjust a feebates program to achieve different 
reductions in global warming pollution: 
 
We found that a feebates program is an effective strategy to reduce global warming 
pollution while benefiting both consumers and retailers.  The combination of the existing 
Pavley regulation with a modest feebates program would achieve a 25 percent greater 
drop in emissions than a regulatory system alone.  Feebates create incentives to both 
manufacturers and consumers to produce and purchase cleaner vehicles.  Furthermore, 
consumers can save thousands of dollars over the lifetime of their vehicles because of 
lower operating costs.  Also, retailers’ revenues can rise more than 6 percent when 
feebates are combined with the existing Pavley regulation.   
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2 Theory 
This section describes the analytical approach and methods we used in this research. The 
theory section has four parts. In the first part we describe the models of the cost of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and of the consumer value of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. The cost functions were derived from documents published by the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) in support of regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions from light vehicles (CARB August 2004 and CARB September 2004)i. The 
value to a consumer of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of his/her own vehicle is 
derived from UMTRI’s model of consumer demand for vehicles and attributes (see 
McManus (2006) for a recent description of the model). 
 
In part two of this section we describe the analytics of meeting the greenhouse reductions 
that are mandated under California’s Vehicle Global Warming Law (AB 1493), which is 
also known as Pavley. Under Pavley, automakers must meet some very aggressive targets 
by 2016, and can do so through a combination of technological improvements and sales- 
mix changes. The automakers face the constrained optimization problem of minimizing 
the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by choosing how much to improve each 
vehicle in their portfolio subject to the requirement to meet Pavley for its fleet overall. 
  
In part three of this section we introduce the concept of feebates that can supplement or 
substitute for Pavley. Under a feebates program, the buyers of dirtier vehicles are charged 
fees that finance rebates to buyers of cleaner vehicles. By raising the full price of dirtier 
vehicles and lowering the full price of cleaner vehicles, a feebates shifts market demand 
toward cleaner vehicles and gives automakers strong incentives to shift their products in 
the same direction. 
 
The fourth part of this section is a brief overview of the UMTRI Consumer Choice 
Model. Using the UMTRI model we simulate the impacts on the light vehicle market in 
California of several alternative scenarios involving Pavley and/or feebates programs. We 
originally developed the UMTRI model for the national market, so for this study we 
calibrated the UMTRI model to the 2002 California market. 
2.1 Cost and Value Functions 
Cost and value are central to evaluating programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Pavley sets aggressive emissions targets, but leaves the automakers free to choose the 
technologies and market offerings it uses for that purpose. Pavley requires each 
automaker to achieve a target sales-weighted average in grams of CO2-equivalent per 
mile across the automaker’s light-duty vehicle lines. The target can be different for each 
automaker since the target is defined using the distribution of the automaker’s light-duty 
vehicle sales and product offerings.  
 
Costs and consumer values drive the technology and product choices of economically 
rational automakers as they respond to both consumers and governments. The economic 
analysis of alternative programs we report here is also based on the costs and consumer 
values. 
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2.1.1 Costs 
We embedded cost functions for reducing greenhouse gases in the UMTRI model using 
the assumptions in CARB (September 2004). We fit exponential functions to CARB’s 
cost estimates for five types of vehicles (as defined by CARB): small cars, small trucks, 
minivans, large cars, and large trucks. Consider the process used for small cars as an 
example. 
 
The figure below is a screenshot of CARB’s cost and CO2 reduction assumptions for 
small cars. We focused this study on the 2016 model year, at which time, according to 
CARB, all of the technology options listed in the figure would be available for use by 
automakers. 
 
The columns “CO2 (g/mi)” and “Retail Price Equivalent 2009” in the small car table were 
used to fit the total cost of improvements (“Retail Price Equivalent 2009”) as an 
exponential function of the level of emissions (“CO2 (g/mi)”). The total cost and marginal 
cost functions, defined in terms of the amount by which CO2 (g/mi) is reduced, are: 
 
! 
Cost = ae
b(g0"g ) 
 
! 
MC = abe
b(g0"g )  
 
In the cost and marginal cost function, g0 is the 2009 level of emissions, g is the level of 
emissions at which cost is being measured, e is the exponential function, and a and b are 
parameters that we estimated by regression analysis.ii  
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Our regression estimates of the a- and b-parameters for the five vehicle types are shown 
in the table below. The b-parameter is the percentage increase in cost that results from a 
one-gram per mile reduction in emissions. For example, reducing large car emissions by 
one gram per mile would increase total cost by 1.41%. The a-parameter is the intercept of 
the total cost function and can be interpreted as the fixed cost of emissions-reduction 
technologies. Appendix A contains graphs of the CARB assumptions and fitted 
exponential curves for the five vehicle types. 
 
Parameters of Cost Functions 
 a b 
LARGE CAR 292  0.0141  
LARGE TRUCK 235  0.0131  
MINIVAN 254  0.0132  
SMALL CAR 271  0.0185  
SMALL TRUCK 231  0.0116  
 
It is important to remember that CARB’s cost estimates are simply the engineering costs 
(plus a mark up) for applying the technologies in a manner that is optimized for CO2 
reduction. Most of the technologies are fungible—they could be used either to enhance 
performance (or other attributes) or to reduce emissions of CO2. CARB’s estimates of 
technical costs ignore these trade offs and isolate CO2 emissions from all other attributes 
of vehicles (horsepower per ton and weight are constant). This makes CARB’s cost 
estimates lower than would be the case if they measured the opportunity cost of applying 
the technology to maximize CO2 reduction rather than simply the engineering cost. The 
opportunity cost would incorporate the value of the technologies in enhancing the 
performance (or other attribute) of vehicles. 
2.1.2 Value 
The value to a consumer of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of his/her own vehicle 
is derived from UMTRI’s model of consumer demand for vehicles and the attributes of 
vehicles (McManus (2006) has a detailed description of the model). McManus (2006) 
examined the costs and benefits of adding specific, identified bundles of technologies to 
vehicles. This study, in contrast, examines actions that continuously vary the reductions 
in emissions (along the cost curve). 
 
In McManus (2006) the consumer value of incremental changes in emissions was 
assumed to be a constant that did not depend on the level of emissions (within a vehicle 
segment). In this study of Pavley and feebates, the UMTRI model was changed to allow 
the consumer value of emission reductions to fall with the level of emissions. This 
change in the model is justified on at least two grounds. Diminishing marginal value, 
common in economics, comes from the assumption that a resource is allocated to the 
most valuable uses first when little of the resource is available, and is allocated to less 
and less valuable uses as the amount available increases. This could apply to almost any 
resource, and thus could apply to automotive emission reduction. Another justification 
for diminishing marginal value comes from a distinctive characteristic of automotive 
emissions and fuel consumption. The technologies that reduce emissions generally do so 
by reducing the fuel necessary to drive a given distance (although there are other options 
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to reduce emissions). This lowers the cost per mile of driving to the consumer, and this in 
turn gives the consumer an incentive to drive more miles. The Law of Demand (in 
economics) states that when the price of a good falls, the quantity of the good demanded 
rises. 
 
The significance of diminishing marginal value by consumers has implications that need 
to be considered in designing programs to reduce emissions from automobiles. The goal 
of Pavley is to reduce the aggregate level of greenhouse gas emissions, not simply to 
reduce the level of emissions per mile of driving, even though the standard is stated in 
terms of emissions per mile of driving. The more that the lower costs per mile induce 
consumers to drive more miles, the less the aggregate reductions can be predicted simply 
from the reductions per mile. If the effect of such offsetting behavior (or “rebound 
effect”) were large, then CARB would need to set a higher per-mile standard to attain a 
given aggregate reduction in emissions than if this effect were small. The UMTRI model 
does not explicitly account for a rebound effect. 
 
In McManus (2006), we identified opportunities for automakers to increase fuel economy 
between now and 2010. In theory, and in the long run, unexploited opportunities would 
not exist in a competitive market. The opportunities identified in McManus (2006) result 
from strongly held prior beliefs by domestic U.S. automakers that based on inaccurate 
models of consumer preferences. Because of federal regulations and the adversarial 
position in which they have put domestic U.S. automakers, the automakers appear to have 
underestimated consumer preferences for fuel economy. One effect of this underestimate 
was their failure to predict the impact of rising fuel prices on demand for vehicles in 
2002-2005. 
 
In this study we have estimated two marginal revenue functions for each vehicle. The 
true MR is derived from the UMTRI Consumer Choice Model. The assumed marginal 
revenue (MR) is derived by a parallel shift of the true MR to equate assumed MR to 
marginal cost (MC) at the baseline level. Manufacturers optimize by equating MC to MR 
across all vehicles in their portfolios, and, if they incorrectly estimate the value of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions to consumers, then the assumed MR would differ from 
the true MR, but the manufacturers would believe themselves to be optimizing. 
 
We defined the true and assumed marginal revenues: 
 
! 
True MR ="
0
#$g#2
Assumed MR ="
1
#$g#2
 
 
The intercept of the true MR curve, α0, is an estimate of the value to the consumer of 
reducing emissions by one gram CO2-equivalent per mile. The intercept of the assumed 
MR curve, α1, equates assumed MR and MC at the base emissions level. The true and 
assumed MR curves are parallel to each other and decrease at an increasing rate as 
emissions are reduced. The parameters of the marginal revenue curves were estimated 
separately for each individual vehicle. Their sales-weighted average values are: 
α0=34.66; α1=27.87; β=2,916,777. 
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2.2 Marginal Cost and Marginal Revenue Graphs 
In this section we show the marginal cost and marginal revenue for the two segments that 
define the extremes (small cars and large trucks). We also comment on the marginal cost 
and marginal revenue for the three other segments (minivans, small trucks, and large 
cars) and show them in the appendix. In each graph we use the same scales for the x-axis 
and y-axis so that the graphs can be directly compared to each other. 
 
Marginal cost and marginal revenue are measured on the vertical axes in dollars per gram 
reduction of CO2-equivalent per mile. The range of the vertical axes is $0 per gram to 
$30 per gram. Greenhouse gas emissions are measured in grams of CO2-equivalent per 
mile on the horizontal axes. The scales are reversed so that movements to the right are 
reductions in greenhouse gases. The horizontal axes limits are 550 grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile to 200 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile. 
 
Small cars have the lowest MC curve and the highest MR curves. The result is that the 
base emissions level for small cars is lower than for any other segment. The difference 
between the assumed and the true MR for small cars is less than $2 per grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile, implying that automakers have more accurate estimates of the value 
of emissions reduction for small cars than they have for any other segment. 
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Small car cost and revenue are at one extreme in most measures and large trucks are 
generally at the other extreme. Large trucks have the highest MC curve and the lowest 
MR curves. These produce the highest base level of emissions per mile. The gap between 
the true and the assumed MR is about $4 per grams of CO2 equivalent per mile, roughly 
the same as it is for small trucks, meaning that automakers have the biggest 
underestimates of the value of emissions-reduction for these two segments. 
 
The other three segments (minivans, small trucks, and large cars) have MR and MC 
curves that fall between those of small cars and large trucks. The MC curve for large cars 
is the second lowest, after that of small cars. The MC curves for minivans and small 
trucks are nearly identical and are higher than that of large cars but lower than that of 
large trucks. The MR curves of small trucks are second lowest, after large trucks. The gap 
between true and assumed MR is nearly the same for large trucks and small trucks. These 
gaps are larger than the gap in any other segment implying that the automakers estimate 
the value of emissions in the vehicles poorly. MR curves for minivans are the next higher 
MR after MR curves for small trucks (and more accurately estimated by automakers). 
MR curves for large cars are the next higher MR after the curves for minivans (and are 
also more accurately estimated by automakers). 
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2.3 Meeting AB 1493 (Pavley) 
California AB 1493, commonly referred to as Pavley for author Assemblywoman Fran 
Pavley, was signed into law by Governor Gray Davis on July 22, 2002. The law requires 
that the California Air Resources Board (CARB) develop and implement greenhouse gas 
emissions limits for light vehicles sold in California beginning in model year 2009. In 
August 2004, CARB released its initial statement of reasons (ISOR) supporting the law 
(CARB August 2004), and in September 2004 released an addendum (CARB September 
2004) with revisions to the ISOR. Also in September 2004, CARB approved light vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions limits for model year 2009. The table below shows the 
emissions limits CARB approved (officially for 2009, anticipated for 2010-2016). The 
automotive industry sued in Federal court, and the case is working its way through the 
court system.  We do not address the question of whether or not Pavley is ultimately 
likely to be approved by the courts. 
 
 
 
For this study we estimated the 2016 Pavley target by automaker as the 2002 sales-
weighted average of the separate requirements for PC/LDT1 and LDT2. The use of 2002 
data was dictated by availability. The vehicle mix has probably changed toward lower 
GHG emissions since 2002, and is likely to change in that direction more by 2009, so 
using the 2002 mix overstates the changes needed. Results need to be used with this in 
mind. 
 
Separate targets were set for the two vehicle types, but Pavley allows the automakers to 
substitute across the types to meet the requirement. The effect is that Pavley effectively 
imposes a single target on each automaker. Each automaker has a unique Pavley target 
determined by its sales mix. The table below gives the hypothetical targets for the 
manufacturers that we computed using the sales mix in 2002.  
 
The automaker targets we use are applied to a single year’s sales (2016) and do not 
necessarily match the overall improvement that CARB estimates Pavley would produce. 
Our single-year target calls for a 27% reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases per 
mile in 2016, but CARB estimates that Pavley would produce a 30% reduction in that 
year. The difference is that CARB is adding up the improvements made each year 
between now and 2016, whereas we are counting only the improvements made to new 
vehicles sold in 2016. Thus, our single-year target and CARB’s overall target are 
consistent with each other. 
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PC/LDT1 LDT2 Toal
DaimlerChrysler 262 55% 45% 100%
Ford Motor Co. 274 45% 55% 100%
General Motors 270 49% 51% 100%
Honda 235 77% 23% 100%
Nissan 252 63% 37% 100%
Others 226 84% 16% 100%
Toyota 260 57% 43% 100%
Total 258 58% 42% 100%
Targets by Class 205 332
*Based on the UMTRI California Database
Sales Mix* 2002
Assumed Model Year 2016 Pavley Targets      
(grams CO2-equivalent per mile)
Target
 
 
We identify the six largest automakers by sales in California, and treat the residual 
(Others) as a seventh automaker. We assume that the hypothetical seventh automaker 
must also meet a Pavley target. This simplification facilitates computation but does not 
significantly alter our conclusions. 
 
This study is as concerned about feebates as it is about Pavley. To understand the 
separate and combined effects of Pavley and feebates, we defined four alternative 
scenarios for model year 2016. 
• Pavley alone: each automaker meets its Pavley target. 
• Feebates alone ($18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile): a feebates program with 
$18 slope. 
• Feebates alone ($36 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile): a feebates program with 
$36 slope; designed to achieve the same market-level reduction in emissions as 
Pavley alone. 
• Pavley plus feebates ($18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile): Both Pavley and a 
feebates program with $18 slope. 
In the remainder of this section we explain the analytics of meeting Pavley, the operation 
of a feebates program in our model, and how the two would work together. The 
automakers compete for market share and profits by offering highly differentiated 
products to consumers.  
 
We assume that each automaker installs technologies on their vehicles to exactly meet 
Pavley’s requirements in 2016, at the smallest possible net cost. Since we have assumed 
that initially MC = MR for each market entry, technologies that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions add more in costs than they add in consumer value. We define the net cost of 
greenhouse gas reductions as the change in costs minus the change in consumer value. 
For each automaker, choosing the reduction in emissions for each of its market entries 
that minimizes the net cost of meeting the Pavley requirements is a constrained 
optimization problem. 
 
The automaker’s problem can be stated as choosing how much to improve each entry to 
minimize technology cost minus consumer value subject to meeting its overall Pavley 
target. 
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! 
Minimize (ci " vi)
i=1
I
# qi
Subject to H = sihi
i=1
I
#
 
Where i indexes the automaker’s vehicles (of the total number I), ci is the cost of 
improving the ith vehicle’s emissions, vi is the value to consumers of the improvement of 
the ith vehicle, hi is the improvement in emissions (in grams of CO2-equivalent per mile), 
qi is the ith vehicle’s unit sales, si is the ith vehicle’s share of the automaker’s total unit 
sales, and H is the improvement in the automaker’s average emissions (in grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile) required by Pavley. The first order conditions for the automaker’s 
optimum are given by the I equations (one for each vehicle): 
! 
mc
i
"mv
i
= #  
Where mci is marginal cost, mvi is marginal value (or marginal revenue) and λ is the 
marginal cost of increasing H. 
 
The solution to the automaker’s constrained optimization problem under Pavley is thus to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for each of its market entries such that all entries have 
the same difference between marginal cost and marginal revenue. This difference equals 
the automaker’s overall marginal cost of reducing its average emissions. 
 
To understand this solution, consider an automaker that must reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 100 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile. The automaker can get the required 
reduction at the lowest net cost by an iterative process: 
 
(1) For each entry compute the reduction in emissions by that entry that would result 
in a 1.0 unit reduction in the automaker’s overall average emissions; 
(2) For each entry compute the change in cost and consumer value that would result 
from the change; 
(3) Implement the change for the entry that has the smallest cost minus consumer 
value;  
(4) If the average has not yet improved by 100, then go to (1), else end. 
 
The solution, equal MC-MR across all of the automaker’s vehicles, assumes that 
automakers do not trade emissions reduction credits. Pavley permits them to trade early 
credits, but by the time Pavley is fully implemented (2016) any early credits are likely to 
have already been used or traded. Pavley also allows each automaker to trade credits 
between classes of vehicles, which is why we set the target based on the automaker’s car-
truck sales split but do not distinguish between cars and trucks in the optimization. 
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The graph above shows the impact of meeting Pavley for a single market entry. The 
arrow points to the vertical line that is equal to λ in length (the difference between MC 
and assumed MR). The graph illustrates the change in economic (consumer plus 
producer) surplus that results from Pavley. Reducing this entry’s emissions from the base 
level (A) to the level that equates MC and true MR) increases economic surplus by the 
area (u). If Pavley requires the automaker to reduce emissions to (B), then reducing 
emissions from the level that equates MC and true MR to (B) lowers economic surplus by 
the area (v). The net impact on economic surplus is (v) minus (u). The automaker makes 
decisions based on the assumed MR, and therefore assumes that the change in economic 
surplus is negative and equal to (v) plus (w). 
 
The efficiency loss arises from the allocation of more resources toward reducing vehicle 
emissions than new-vehicle buyers would choose on their own. The loss is measured 
from a purely private point of view. However, not all of the costs of vehicle emissions are 
borne by new-vehicle buyers. Greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles impose costs 
on all of us through global warming. The efficiency losses from reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (measured in this study) have to be compared to the externality costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions (not measured in this study). 
2.4 Feebates 
A feebates program gives incentives to consumers to buy, and to manufacturers to 
produce and sell cleaner products by combining a fee on dirtier products with a rebate on 
cleaner products. See Greene et al. 2005 and Johnson 2006 for examples of feebates 
programs applied to vehicles. Two features of feebates programs have made them 
attractive to policy makers. By addressing choices across the full range of alternatives, 
feebates programs have the potential to stimulate more significant changes than one-sided 
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approaches. Probably more important is that a feebates program can be structured so that 
the fees collected equal the rebates paid, making the program self-financing. The figure 
below can be used to explain the parameters of a feebates program for vehicle emissions. 
 
The Parameters of a Feebates Program 
 
The basic feebate function (fee if positive, rebate if negative) is defined by an emissions-
level pivot point and a slope in dollars. The fee or rebate for a particular market entry is 
larger (in absolute value) the greater the difference between the market entry’s emissions 
and the pivot point. For example, with an slope of $18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per 
mile and a pivot point of 350 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile, the fee due for a vehicle 
with emissions of 425 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile would be $18x(425-350) = 
$1,350. The fee due for a vehicle with emissions of 450 grams of CO2-equivalent per 
mile would be $18x(450-350) = $1,800. Optional elements include a “zero band” for 
which fees or rebates are zero (defined by upper and lower emissions levels) and limits 
on the maximum fee and maximum rebate. 
 
! 
Feebate = f (g" gpivot )    if g > gupper  or g < glower
Feebate = 0    if g lower # g # gupper
 
 
For this study the feebates was defined with a slope of $18 or $36 per grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile. We further constrained the absolute value of the feebates to be not 
more than the smaller of $2,500 or 7.7% of the vehicle’s transaction price (7.7% is the 
sales tax rate). The $18 slope is comparable to the Federal Gas Guzzler tax, which has an 
implicit slope of $20 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile. The Federal Gas Guzzler tax 
applies to cars but not to trucks, and very few consumers are required to pay the tax. 
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The upper and lower limits of the zero band were set so that at least 20% of sales fell 
between them. The pivot point was found through iteration to make the program revenue-
neutral, with total fees collected equal total rebates paid. The steps that were iterated to 
find the pivot point was as follows: 
(1) Once the upper and lower limits were set, the pivot point was initially set equal to 
the midpoint between them. 
(2) The model was solved for this pivot point and total fees and total rebates were 
computed. 
(3) If fees exceed rebates then the pivot is moved toward the upper limit, if rebates 
exceed fees then the pivot is moved toward the lower limit. 
(4) Loop back to (2). 
(5) Continue (using progressively smaller changes in the pivot) until the difference 
between fees and rebates is less than ±$0.05. 
 
It should be mentioned that integer values were used for the upper and lower limits of the 
zero band, but the pivot point had up to 12 digits to the right of the decimal point. It 
would be much easier to ensure that fees would exceed rebates (or rebates would exceed 
fees) than to ensure that the program was revenue neutral. 
 
The incentives for consumers to demand and automakers to supply vehicles with reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions can be seen by comparing the situation after feebates are 
imposed and before a technology response with the situation after the technology 
response. 
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Initially, the MR and MC curves for a vehicle intersect at the base (GHG0), and the 
system is in equilibrium. A feebates program is introduced that has the effect of shifting 
the MR curve to MR + f. At GHG0 a buyer of a high polluting vehicle would now have to 
payiii a fee of f(GHG0-GHGpivot), the shaded area in the figure. The next graph shows 
what would happen to the fee if the automaker were to reduce the vehicle’s greenhouse 
emissions to GHG1, the point at which the MC curve intersects the MR + f curve. At 
GHG1 a buyer of the vehicle would now have to pay a fee of f(GHG1-GHGpivot), the new 
shaded area in the figure. Since the heights of the shaded areas in the two figures are 
equal (to f), and the pivot point is unchanged, the fee is lower in the second figure. 
 
A feebates program results in a parallel shift of the effective marginal revenue curve 
(from the consumer’s point of view) from MR to MR + f, except in the zero band. To 
either side of the zero band, the effective MR becomes MR + f. If a vehicle’s emissions 
earn a rebate for the consumer, then reducing emissions even further would increase the 
rebate. If a vehicle’s emissions require the consumer to pay a fee, then reducing 
emissions would reduce the fee. Thus, the MR + f curve is parallel to the MR curve, and 
MR + f > MR at every point not in the zero band. 
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The reduction in fees (or the increase in rebates) is what makes consumers demand (and 
automakers supply) cleaner vehicles. The incentive to move to cleaner technologies 
applies at all levels of current emissions. Just as the prospect of lower fees encourages 
makers of dirtier vehicles to make them cleaner in the above example, the prospect of 
higher rebates encourages makers of cleaner vehicles to make them even cleaner. 
Simulations were completed for this study under two alternative assumptions about 
whether automakers would respond to the feebates by changing the technologies in their 
vehicles. In every case we examined, the automakers would gain if they were to respond 
by adding technology. Therefore, in this report, we show only scenarios in which 
automakers respond by applying technology.  
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The inclusion of a zero band in the feebates program limits the improvement that would 
be induced for some vehicles. In particular, vehicles that have MC curves that intersect 
the MR + f curve in the vertical segment at the upper limit of the zero band, would be 
improved only to the upper limit of the zero band. If we eliminated the zero band, then 
vehicles in this situation would be improved up to the intersection of MC and MR + f. 
Our feebates simulations have a substantial number of vehicles “stacking up” at the upper 
limit of the zero band. However, the additional improvements to each vehicle that would 
be possible without the zero band were very small, so the aggregate effect of the zero 
band’s improvement limits were also small. 
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2.5 UMTRI Consumer Choice Model 
This study’s aim is to assess the potential of alternative policies to reduce California’s 
greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles. The reaction of California’s new vehicle buyers 
is central to this assessment. We developed a model of California’s vehicle market from 
UMTRI’s Consumer Choice Model (McManus et al. 2005 and McManus 2006). The 
model uses a nested multinomial logit to describe the choice process that consumers 
follow when choosing among different vehicles. The demand for a specific vehicle in the 
model depends on the vehicle’s “loadings” of performance (horsepower per ton), size 
(weight in pounds), and fuel economy (fuel cost per mile) and the values that consumers 
place on these attributes. 
 
For this study we derived California-specific estimates consumers’ willingness to pay for 
vehicle attributes from a hedonic price regression (Espey and Nair 2005 and McManus 
2006) on the California 2002 data (described below). According to this analysis, the 
implicit market value of fuel economy in California in 2002 was in the range of $400 to 
$600 per mile per gallon. The U.S. national-level implicit value of fuel economy with the 
same data (but with U.S. 2002 prices and sales) was consistently lower by 5% to 7%. 
Californians valued fuel economy more highly than residents of other states in 2002. The 
magnitude of our estimates of the value of fuel economy to consumers is consistent with 
McManus [2006] and Espey and Nair [2005], both of which used similar hedonic 
approaches.   
 
In the workings of the model we used the value of fuel economy to calibrate a discount 
rate that we applied to fuel cost savings. Assuming (along with Espey and Nair [2005] 
and CBO [2003]) a 14-year useful life for the average vehicle and assuming annual miles 
driven decline at 5.2% per year of vehicle age, the discount rate implied by the national-
level analysis in McManus [2006] would be negative, (0.35%).  For California, our 
current analysis implies a negative discount rate of -3% to -5%. The discount rate can be 
thought of as the real market rate of interest minus the expected rate of inflation in fuel 
prices (over and above general price inflation). Economists usually assume that the real 
market rate of interest is on the order of 4% to 8%, so a negative discount rate implies 
that consumers expect inflation in fuel prices to be higher than the real rate of interest.  
Espey and Nair [2005] also found very low or negative discount rates, and suggested that 
consumers value reductions in greenhouse gases and other emissions. This is a plausible 
interpretation, but we believe expected inflation in fuel prices is a more likely cause of 
negative discount rates. 
 
Even though we have evidence that a negative discount rate would be appropriate for 
valuing fuel cost savings, we wanted to be conservative, and used 5% as the discount rate 
in our scenarios. This is lower than rates used in other studies. CBO [2003] and 
McManus et al. (2005) used 14%. Santini and Vyas (2005) used 10%. Greene, Duleep, 
and McManus (2004) used 0.0%, but assumed that new vehicle buyers value only about 
the first three years of cost savings. 
 
Choosing the discount rate to use in our analysis is more than a mere technicality. The 
discount rate summarizes an assumption about the value consumers place on future 
benefits and costs and their expectations of future fuel prices. Consumer demand for 
automobiles is derived from the value consumers put on current and future services 
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(transportation, fashion) offset by current and future costs. The higher the discount rate, 
the less value put on future services and costs relative to current services and costs. 
 
The table below summarizes this section by giving our estimates of demand elasticities 
for price, performance, size, and fuel cost per mile (using either 0% and 5% discount 
rates). 
 
Discount 
Rate 0%
Discount 
Rate 5%
Car-Luxury (1.90) 1.51 0.86 (0.12) (0.09)
Car-Midsize (2.00) 2.43 1.51 (0.24) (0.18)
Car-Small (2.30) 2.66 1.61 (0.26) (0.19)
CUV-Luxury (1.90) 1.36 1.24 (0.18) (0.13)
CUV-Midsize (2.00) 1.97 1.57 (0.26) (0.19)
CUV-Small (2.30) 2.08 1.72 (0.25) (0.19)
Minivan (2.00) 1.79 1.85 (0.27) (0.20)
Pickup-Large (1.40) 2.15 1.93 (0.37) (0.27)
Pickup-Small (2.00) 2.23 1.97 (0.37) (0.28)
SUV_Large Luxury (1.90) 0.93 1.16 (0.19) (0.14)
SUV-Large (2.00) 1.36 1.56 (0.27) (0.20)
SUV-Midsize (2.10) 1.60 1.60 (0.29) (0.22)
SUV-Midsize Luxury (1.90) 1.00 1.14 (0.17) (0.13)
SUV-Small (2.30) 1.93 1.59 (0.27) (0.20)
Van-Large (1.50) 1.87 2.33 (0.42) (0.31)
The demand elasticity of an attribute meaures the percentage change in unit sales for a 
one (1.0) percent change in the attribute (all other attributes being held constant). For 
example, increasing the prices of all luxury cars by one percent would cause a 1.9% 
drop in unit sales.
UMTRI Consumer Choice Model: Demand Elasticities
Vehicle Segment
Fuel Cost per Mile
Performance 
(HP per Ton)
Size          
(Curb 
Weight)
Vehicle Price    
($)
 
 
The relative magnitudes of the elasticities with respect to performance, size, and fuel cost 
per mile indicate that consumer demand is more responsive to performance than to size, 
and consumer demand is significantly more responsive to performance and size than to 
fuel cost per mile. For example, consider the luxury car segment. A 1.0 percent increase 
in performance of luxury cars would increase the number of luxury car demanded by 1.51 
percent, and a 1.0 percent increase in size would increase the number of luxury cars 
demanded by 0.86 percent. Fuel cost per mile would need to be improved by 9.5 percent 
to get the same impact on demand as a 1.0 percent improvement in size, and fuel cost per 
mile would need to be improved by 17 percent to get the same impact on demand as a 1.0 
percent increase in performance (using the 5% discount rate). 
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3 Data 
We have data on model year 2002 sales of vehicles in California by make and model. We 
matched these data with California-specific transaction price data and national-level splits 
of each model into engine, transmission, body style, and drive type configurations (used 
in Greene, Duleep, and McManus [2004]). Information on vehicle attributes (horsepower, 
weight, fuel cost per mile) also came from the national-level data. Our California data 
covers 895 market entries for 2002.iv The table below shows average price, horsepower, 
curb weight, and GHG by Pavley class and automaker for California in 2002. 
 
Price
Horse-
power
Curb 
Weight
GHG Price
Horse-
power
Curb 
Weight
GHG
DaimlerChrysler $28,033 181 3460 319 $26,143 215 4412 452
Ford Motor Co. $24,640 179 3213 319 $26,496 214 4463 427
General Motors $21,528 174 3153 304 $27,778 251 4843 443
Honda $20,905 154 2894 268 $27,700 200 4223 350
Nissan $22,480 192 3031 303 $24,446 177 4191 418
Others $26,471 170 3137 310 $28,459 191 4329 400
Toyota $25,397 172 3095 284 $26,730 202 4179 389
Total $24,433 173 3153 302 $26,828 217 4461 423
Pavley Class 1 (PC/LDT1) Pavley Class 2 (LDT2)
 
 
Averages can cover considerable variability in attributes. The figure below plots the base 
distribution of greenhouse gas emissions by new vehicles sold in California in 2002. 
 
 
This distribution has at least two modes. The part of the distribution above 400 grams of 
CO2-equivalent per mile represents most midsize and large trucks, while the part below 
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400 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile represent smaller trucks and cars. The vertical 
scale was chosen for displaying changes in the distribution that we will show later. 
 
The table below shows the unit sales in California for model year 2002 by automaker and 
UMTRI vehicle type. 
 
Cars CUVs Minivans Pickups SUVs Large Vans All Types
DaimlerChrysler 159,531 0 33,683 40,281 93,110 2,693 329,298
Ford Motor Co. 186,932 22,562 17,784 83,870 104,360 8,392 423,900
General Motors 183,021 8,083 18,399 85,268 82,731 8,735 386,237
Honda 169,137 26,944 24,651 0 0 0 220,732
Nissan 76,605 0 3,857 17,157 24,106 0 121,725
Others 196,639 18,011 7,380 0 24,131 0 246,161
Toyota 183,845 53,696 18,981 45,000 21,312 0 322,834
All Automakers 1,155,710 129,296 124,735 271,576 349,750 19,820 2,050,887
California Sales by Automaker and UMTRI Vehicle Type,          
Model Year 2002
 
 
Ford and General Motors are the only “full-line” automakers with products of every type. 
Honda has the most concentrated product range (we classify the Ridgeline pickup as a 
crossover CUV). 
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4 Results 
This section presents the results of our simulations. We highlight changes in greenhouse 
gas emissions, unit sales of light vehicles, prices to consumers, revenues to retailers, and 
cash flows of the feebates program. We assessed the potential impacts of Pavley and 
feebates on California’s vehicle market and greenhouse gas emissions by simulating the 
outcome under four alternative situations for model year 2016: 
 
• Pavley alone: assumes that each automaker meets its 2016 Pavley requirement by 
applying technologies to vehicles so that the loss of consumer plus producer surplus 
is minimized. 
• Feebates alone ($18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile): assumes that the state 
adopts a feebates program with a slope of $18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile. 
Automakers apply technologies so that for each vehicle, the marginal cost equals the 
marginal revenue plus $18 (except in the zero band). 
• Feebates alone ($36 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile): assumes that the state 
adopts a feebates program with a slope of $36 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile. 
Automakers apply technologies so that for each vehicle, the marginal cost equals the 
marginal revenue plus $36 (except in the zero band). This program is designed to 
achieve the same overall reduction in emissions as Pavley alone. 
• Pavley plus feebates: assumes that each automaker meets its 2016 Pavley 
requirement, at a minimum. The state also adopts a feebates program with a slope of 
$18 per grams of CO2-equivalent per mile, motivating automakers to exceed Pavley. 
 
We compared these situations to the 2002 baseline. To meet Pavley, or in response to the 
feebates program, we assume that automakers use technology to improve the emissions 
individual vehicles. We assume this adds cost according to CARB’s cost curves, and 
changes consumer demand and automakers’ revenue according to UMTRI’s market 
model. CARB’s cost curves overstate the ability of automakers to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and also assume that vehicle performance and weight are not affected. We do 
not change the attributes of hybrid or diesel vehicles in the simulations because these 
vehicles do not have room for much improvement. Total vehicle sales in California are 
allowed to vary by scenario, based on demand elasticities and changes in the average 
value of attributes, such as emissions. 
 
In scenarios without feebates, the price of each vehicle is defined as the baseline price 
plus the cost of new technology used. Feebates create a wedge between the price a 
consumer pays and the price (revenue) the auto retailer receives. We define price and 
variable profit in the feebates scenarios as:  
 
! 
Price to consumer :    P1 = P0 + C + F
Price to auto retailer :   P2 = P0 + C
" = #P2
Where P0 = baseline price of vehicle, C = cost of technology, F = value of fee or rebate,
" = variable profit, and # =  variable profit rate.
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4.1 Summary of Key Results 
The table below summarizes the results of our simulation by examining the differences 
between the base case and the scenarios according to five key variables: average 
greenhouse gas emissions for the overall California market (grams of CO2-equilavent per 
mile), the total numbers of vehicles sold, the average retail price, retailers’ total revenue 
(in billions of dollars), and the consumer price plus the lifetime fuel savings (a negative 
value equals savings to the consumer). The first panel of the table provides the levels of 
the key variables under each scenario. The second panel shows the difference from the 
base of those variables. The third panel shows the percent difference from the base of 
each variable. 
 
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
per gram 
per mile)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
per gram 
per mile)
Pavley plus 
feebates 
($18)
Emissions (g CO2-eq/mi) 352 258 292 258 235
Sales 2,050,887 2,057,040 2,040,778 2,033,128 1,967,327
Retail Price $25,429 $26,704 $26,086 $26,593 $28,295
Retailers' Revenue (billions) $52.2 $54.9 $53.2 $54.1 $55.7
Price plus Lifetime Fuel Cost $36,435 $34,782 $35,201 $34,642 $35,631
Emissions (g CO2-eq/mi) 0 (94) (60) (94) (117)
Sales 0 6,153 (10,109) (17,759) (83,560)
Retail Price $0 $1,275 $658 $1,164 $2,866
Retailers' Revenue (billions) $0.0 $2.8 $1.1 $1.9 $3.5
Price plus Lifetime Fuel Cost $0 ($1,652) ($1,234) ($1,793) ($804)
Emissions (g CO2-eq/mi) 0.0% -26.7% -17.1% -26.7% -33.3%
Sales 0.0% 0.3% -0.5% -0.9% -4.1%
Retail Price 0.0% 5.0% 2.6% 4.6% 11.3%
Retailers' Revenue (billions) 0.0% 5.3% 2.1% 3.7% 6.7%
Price plus Lifetime Fuel Cost 0.0% -4.5% -3.4% -4.9% -2.2%
Percent Difference from Base
Summary of Key Results by Scenario
Difference from Base
 
 
By construction, Pavley alone and Feebates alone (at $36) have the same impact on 
average greenhouse gas emissions per mile statewide—reducing that average from 352 to 
258 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile (down 26.7%). However, these two scenarios 
have very different impacts on vehicle sales, consumer prices, and revenues for retailers. 
Under Pavley alone, vehicles cost an average of 5.0% more than under the base scenario, 
while under Feebates alone (at $36), vehicles cost an average of 4.6% more than under 
the base scenario.  
 
Under Pavley alone, lower emissions combined with higher prices result in slightly 
higher vehicle sales than base (up 0.3%). However, under Feebates alone (at $36), lower 
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emissions combined with a higher price result in a slight reduction in sales (down 0.9%). 
Although the average price of vehicles rises under both scenarios because of new 
technology, only under Feebates alone (at $36) does the price of dirtier vehicles rise and 
that of cleaner vehicles fall. This shifts sales toward cleaner vehicles, and lower overall 
sales are one result.  
 
Retailers’ revenue rises more under Pavley alone than under Feebates alone (at $36). 
Lower fuel costs over vehicle lifetimes more than compensate consumers for increases in 
purchase price. The average consumer ends up saving $141 more under Feebates alone 
(at $36) than under Pavley alone, because feebates generate more economically efficient 
reductions in emissions, and automakers pass at least part of these efficiency gains on to 
consumers. 
 
Feebates alone (at $18) have about two-thirds as strong an impact on greenhouse gas 
emissions as Pavley alone, reducing average emissions from 352 grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile to 292 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile (down 17.1%). Under 
Feebates alone (at $18), the average price of a vehicle increases less than under Pavley 
alone or Feebates alone (at $36), sales fall relative to base but less than they do under 
Feebates alone (at $36), and revenue rises less than under Pavley alone.  Consumers end 
up saving more money over the lifetime of their vehicles because of lower operating 
costs.  Because automakers install fewer technologies under Feebates alone (at $18), 
consumers end up saving less than under Pavley alone and Feebates alone (at $36).   
 
The biggest reduction in greenhouse gas emissions occurs under Pavley plus feebates 
(33%). In this scenario, the average price of a vehicle is higher, and thus sales are lower, 
relative to base than under Pavley alone. However, the higher price of vehicles more than 
compensates automakers for lower sales, pushing market revenue to $55.7 billion.  
What’s more, consumers’ savings from lower lifetime fuel costs exceed the cost of added 
technology under Pavley plus feebates—although consumers save less than under the 
other scenarios.   
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4.2 Sources of Change in Emissions 
For each scenario, the table below shows the change in greenhouse gas emissions per 
mile, and how much of that change is due to technology and how much is due to market 
shifts reflecting changes in the vehicle mix . We assumed that automakers would apply 
technologies to their vehicles to meet Pavley and in response to feebates as long as the 
marginal value to consumers exceeded the marginal cost to automakers. Technology is 
the primary source of changes in emissions, indicating that the costs of improving 
emissions to meet the Pavely requirements are reasonable. 
 
Tech- 
nology
Market 
Shift
Total
Tech- 
nology
Market 
Shift
Total
Base 352 0 0.0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Pavley alone 258 (95) 0.9 (94) -26.9% 0.26% -26.7%
Feebates alone ($18 slope) 292 (59) (1.1) (60) -16.7% -0.31% -17.1%
Feebates alone ($36 slope) 258 (93) (1.1) (94) -26.4% -0.32% -26.7%
Pavley plus Feebates ($18) 235 (117) 0.1 (117) -33.3% 0.03% -33.3%
Impact on Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 
Scenario and Source
Grams 
CO2-
Equiv per 
Mile
Change Compared to Base
G CO2-Equil per Mile Percent of Base
 
 
In Pavley alone and in Pavley plus feebates, the shift in sales mix slightly offsets cuts in 
emissions produced by technology. Thus automakers would have to use additional 
technology to fulfill the Pavely standards than is needed in these scenarios than would be 
the case if there were no market shift. In contrast, in Feebates alone (at $18) and Feebates 
alone (at $36), a shift in sales mix toward cleaner vehicles slightly reduces the need for 
technology improvements to reduce emissions. This illustrates a key difference between 
market-based mechanisms (feebates) and mandates (Pavley). In both strategies, 
technologies that clean up vehicle emissions add cost. However, in the Feebates 
strategies, feebates for the cleanest vehicles offset those costs, shifting sales toward 
cleaner vehicles. Still, in all the scenarios, changes in emissions stemming from changes 
in the sales mix were small. 
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4.3 Changes in Emissions by Scenario and Segment 
The table below shows the impact of the scenarios on greenhouse gas emissions in 
different segments of the vehicle market. The first panel shows the level of greenhouse 
gas emissions by segment and scenario, and the second panel shows percent differences 
relative to the base. 
 
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
slope)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
slope)
Pavley plus 
Feebates 
($18)
Car 302 220 254 225 204
Van 370 275 305 270 249
Pickup 436 323 361 320 289
SUV 419 303 344 302 273
Total 352 258 292 258 235
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
slope)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
slope)
Pavley plus 
Feebates 
($18)
Car 0% -27% -16% -25% -32%
Van 0% -26% -18% -27% -33%
Pickup 0% -26% -17% -27% -34%
SUV 0% -28% -18% -28% -35%
Total 0% -27% -17% -27% -33%
California Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
by CARB Segment and Scenario           
(grams CO2 equivalent per mile)
Relative to Base (percent change)        
 
 
Both Pavley alone and Feebates alone (at $36) reduce emissions in the overall vehicle 
market by 27%. Both scenarios also reduce emissions of SUVs by 28%. However, Pavley 
alone reduces emissions for cars slightly more—and reduces emissions for vans and 
pickups slightly less—than Feebates alone (at $36)  
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4.4 Changes in the Distribution of Emissions 
 
The graphs below compare the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions under each 
scenario superimposed over the base distribution. Pavley alone creates a new emission 
peak at 225 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile, with a cluster between 180 and 250 grams 
of CO2-equivalent per mile. 
 
 
 
Feebates alone (at $18) create a smaller but similar cluster between 200 and 230 grams of 
CO2-equivalent per mile. The tallest spike occurs at the upper limit (293 grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile) of the zero band (261 to 293 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile). 
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Feebates alone (at $36) create a tight cluster between 180 and 220 grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile. The tallest spike occurs at the upper limit (256 grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile) of the zero band (225 to 256 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile). 
 
 
 
Pavley plus Feebates (at $18) creates a very tight cluster between 170 and 210 grams of 
CO2-equivalent per mile. The tallest spike occurs at the upper limit (236 grams of CO2-
equivalent per mile) of the zero band (205 to 236 grams of CO2-equivalent per mile). 
 
 
 
The histograms qualitatively show that all scenarios achieve significant reductions in 
emissions compared to the base scenario.   
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4.5 Changes in Consumer Expenditures 
The overall cost of a vehicle to a consumer has two elements: acquisition and operation. 
Acquisition costs would include price plus fees minus rebates, licensing, and the present 
value of financing. Operation costs include fuel, maintenance, and insurance. The table 
below shows the impact of the scenarios on major portions of acquisition and operation 
costs: retail price, feebates, and lifetime fuel cost. Negative values represent savings for 
consumers, while positive values represent higher expenditures for consumers. The 
estimates of lifetime fuel savings are based on CARB’s estimates of vehicle miles 
traveled, which are 202,329 for cars and 233,418 for trucks.v 
 
Scenario Car Van Pickup SUV Market
Lifetime Fuel Savings ($2,432) ($3,090) ($3,712) ($3,786) ($2,928)
Retail Price Change $1,253 $989 $1,367 $1,242 $1,275
Total Change ($1,178) ($2,100) ($2,344) ($2,544) ($1,652)
Lifetime Fuel Savings ($1,428) ($2,117) ($2,456) ($2,429) ($1,892)
Retail Price Change $536 $743 $959 $920 $658
Net Feebate ($652) $172 $1,187 $928 $0
Total Change ($1,544) ($1,203) ($311) ($581) ($1,234)
Lifetime Fuel Savings ($2,281) ($3,254) ($3,812) ($3,817) ($2,957)
Retail Price Change $979 $1,270 $1,633 $1,516 $1,164
Net Feebate ($877) $235 $1,444 $1,353 $0
Total Change ($2,179) ($1,748) ($735) ($948) ($1,793)
Lifetime Fuel Savings ($2,904) ($3,949) ($4,817) ($4,770) ($3,670)
Retail Price Change $2,618 $2,726 $3,514 $3,227 $2,866
Net Feebate ($541) $280 $966 $673 $0
Total Change ($827) ($943) ($337) ($870) ($804)
Total Change= the total change in consumer expenditure.
Lifetime Fuel Cost = present value at 5% discount of fuel saved assuming CARB life and VMT.
Retail Transaction Price = change in price from the retailer's point of view.
Net Feebate = impact of feebate on price from the consumer's point of view.
Change in Price and Lifetime Fuel Cost by Scenario
Pavley plus feebates 
($18)
Pavley alone
Feebates alone         
($18 per gram per mile)
Negative values represent reductions in consumer expenditure.
Price of gasoline = $1.74/gallon
Feebates alone         
($36 per gram per mile)
 
 
The average vehicle price is higher in every scenario than in the base, because the price 
includes the cost of technologies used to improve emissions. The average feebates is a 
rebate (negative) for cars and a fee (positive) for trucks in all scenarios. The analysis in 
the table are weighted by sales, showing that the changes shown are driven by 
technologies.  
 
In every scenario and for every vehicle type, the present value of fuel savings over the 
lifetime of the vehicle more than compensates for increases in the vehicle’s price. Under 
all the Feebates scenarios, the feebates lowers the average consumer price of cars while 
raising the average price of other types of vehicles. In the overall market, consumers’ 
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expenditures to purchase and fuel their vehicles are lower in all scenarios compared to the 
base. 
 38 
4.6 Changes in Sales by Scenario and Segment 
The table below shows the impact of the scenarios on vehicle sales in different segments 
of the market. The first panel shows sales by segment and scenario, and the second panel 
shows percent differences relative to the base. 
 
 
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
slope)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
slope)
Pavley 
plus 
Feebates 
($18)
Car 1,155 1,135 1,173 1,172 1,109
Van 145 148 143 143 140
Pickup 272 278 263 261 263
SUV 480 495 462 457 455
Total 2,051 2,057 2,041 2,033 1,967
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
slope)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
slope)
Pavley 
plus 
Feebates 
($18)
Car 0.0% -1.7% 1.6% 1.5% -3.9%
Van 0.0% 2.7% -1.0% -1.0% -3.3%
Pickup 0.0% 2.3% -3.1% -4.0% -3.1%
SUV 0.0% 3.2% -3.9% -4.8% -5.2%
Total 0.0% 0.3% -0.5% -0.9% -4.1%
California Light Vehicle Sales by CARB 
Segment and Scenario           
(Thousands of Units)
Relative to Base (percent change)        
 
 
 
 
Under Pavley alone, total sales are up 0.3%, while sales of cars are down 1.7% and sales 
of trucks are up. In contrast, under Feebates alone (at $18) and Feebates alone (at $36), 
total sales are down, while sales of cars are up and sales of trucks are down. Under 
Pavley plus feebates (at $18), sales are down in all segments. This shows that the 
consumer demand shifts toward cleaner vehicles in the feebates alone scenarios. 
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4.7 Changes in Retailers’ Revenue by Scenario and Segment 
The table below shows the impact of the scenarios on the revenue of California retailers 
stemming from different segments of the market. The first panel shows the level of 
revenue by segment and scenario, and the second panel shows percent differences 
relative to the base. 
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
slope)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
slope)
Pavley plus 
Feebates 
($18)
Car $28.4 $29.3 $29.4 $29.9 $30.1
Van $3.4 $3.6 $3.5 $3.5 $3.7
Pickup $6.0 $6.5 $6.1 $6.2 $6.7
SUV $14.4 $15.5 $14.3 $14.4 $15.1
Total $52.2 $54.9 $53.2 $54.1 $55.7
Base
Pavley 
alone
Feebates 
alone ($18 
slope)
Feebates 
alone ($36 
slope)
Pavley plus 
Feebates 
($18)
Car 0.0% 3.3% 3.8% 5.6% 6.3%
Van 0.0% 7.0% 2.1% 4.3% 7.9%
Pickup 0.0% 8.7% 1.1% 3.1% 12.4%
SUV 0.0% 7.4% -0.9% 0.0% 4.9%
Total 0.0% 5.3% 2.1% 3.7% 6.7%
Retailers' Revenue by CARB Segment 
and Scenario           
($billions)
Relative to Base (percent change)        
 
 
In all the scenarios, retailers’ revenue is larger than in the base. Under Feebates scenarios, 
cars contribute relatively more to total revenue, while trucks contribute less, again 
showing a shift toward cleaner vehicles.  
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5 Summary and Directions for Further Research 
Concern over climate change is growing in America and the debate over policies to 
regulate the emissions that contribute to global warming is proceeding faster than anyone 
imagined just a few years ago. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mass. V. EPA 
has given new momentum to federal actions as well as to additional state actions. 
In California, Assembly Bill 1493 (commonly referred to as Pavley) orders the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) to “develop and adopt regulations that achieve the 
maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor 
vehicles.” Based upon an evaluation of near and mid-term emissions reducing 
technologies and their costs, CARB has developed annual fleet-wide emissions targets for 
passenger cars and light duty trucks. 
In addition to establishing mandatory emissions limits, there are other possible means of 
reducing global warming pollutants, such as creating economic incentives for consumers 
to buy and manufacturers to produce cleaner vehicles. A feebates program provides such 
incentives by combining a fee on vehicles with high emissions along with a rebate on 
cleaner vehicles. This study estimated impacts of feebates and Pavley (separately and in 
combination) on California’s greenhouse gas emissions for model year 2016. 
We estimated the impact of different policy combinations on emissions, prices, and 
vehicle sales using an economic model we developed for California. We examined the 
cost and value to the consumer of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Our cost estimates 
were based on CARB’s projections of the costs of technologies that automakers could 
apply to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. CARB’s estimates assume that all technology 
changes would be applied to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We fitted exponential 
functions to CARB’s technology packages to specify the cost of reducing emissions in 
our model. Exponential cost functions have more rapidly rising marginal costs than 
quadratic cost functions would, and offset the assumption that all improvements would be 
applied to reducing emissions.  
 
We derived the value to a consumer of reducing his vehicle’s greenhouse gas emissions 
from UMTRI’s model of consumer demand for vehicle attributes. The demand for a 
specific vehicle depends on the vehicle’s “loadings” of performance (horsepower per 
ton), size (weight in pounds), and fuel economy (fuel cost per mile) and the values that 
consumers place on these attributes. To meet Pavley or in response to the feebates 
program, we assume that automakers respond by using technology to improve individual 
vehicles. We further assume that this adds cost according to CARB’s cost curves and 
changes demand and revenue according to UMTRI’s market model. We allowed total 
vehicle sales in California to vary by scenario, based on market-level demand elasticities 
and changes in the average market values of attributes. 
 
We assessed the impacts of Pavley and feebates on California’s vehicle market and 
greenhouse gas emissions by simulating the outcome under four alternative situations for 
model year 2016: Pavley alone, Feebates alone (at $18 slope), Feebates alone (at $36 
slope), and Pavley plus feebates (at $18 slope). 
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In Pavley alone the price is defined as the baseline price plus the cost of technology used. 
Feebates alone (at $36) and Pavley alone would each reduce the market average 
greenhouse gas emissions per mile by 26.7%. Pavley alone has a 5.0% higher average 
price than base, while Feebates alone (at $36) has a 4.6% higher average price than base. 
Under Pavley alone, lower emissions combined with a higher price result in slightly 
higher sales than base (up 0.3%). However, under Feebates alone (at $36) lower 
emissions combined with a higher price result in a slight reduction in sales (down 0.9%). 
Both scenarios have price increases from new technologies, but under Feebates alone (at 
$36) the fees and rebates make prices of dirtier vehicles rise and those of cleaner vehicles 
fall. This shifts sales toward cleaner vehicles, and lower overall sales are one result. 
However, the lower fuel costs over the lifetime of the vehicle more than compensates the 
consumer for the increase in purchase price. Among the simulations, the biggest 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions occurs in Pavley plus feebates (33%). Sales are 
lower and average price is higher relative to base than under Pavley alone.  
 
In Pavley alone and in Pavley plus feebates, a market shift slightly offsets the 
improvements produced by technology. In both strategies technologies are added that 
clean up vehicle emissions adding cost, but in the feebates strategies these costs are offset 
by feebates for the cleanest vehicles..  
 
There are several enhancements that were suggested by our analysis for this study. 
• We are pursuing an update using more current California market data. 
• CARB’s cost estimates were based on NAS and NESCAAF—studies that are now a 
few years old. It would be valuable to update them. 
• Adding more vehicle attributes to the model would make it capable of greater 
precision. 
• It would be preferable to model the technical trade-offs directly rather than 
summarize them in cost functions. We are pursuing this approach in another study of 
the U.S. market. 
• We are also enhancing the model to allow us to analyze other policies at the national 
market level (CAFE, cap and trade, rebates alone, fuel taxes, manufacturer incentives 
for investing in technology). 
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7 Appendix A: Exponential Cost Functions 
The graphs below display the California ARB cost assumptions for five types of vehicles: 
small cars, large cars, minivans, small trucks, and large trucks. In each graph the CARB 
assumptions on total cost and reduction in emissions are plotted as dots and two 
alternative fitted functions (exponential and quadratic) are plotted as curves. Quadratic 
cost functions imply linear marginal cost functions and exponential cost functions imply 
exponential marginal cost functions. We chose to use exponential cost functions for this 
study as the more conservative choice. Rising marginal costs are more conservative than 
are linear marginal costs, especially as we simulate large reductions in emissions. Cubic 
total cost functions (quadratic marginal cost functions) would have produced results 
similar to what the exponential functions produced in our simulations. 
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8 Appendix B: Hedonic Regressions 
Regressions were run on the 2002 vehicle data separately for California and the U.S. in 
which the dependent variable was the retail price. Independent variables were horsepower 
per ton, curb weight, gallons per mile, and dummy variables for manufacturers. The basic 
results are shown below. The table below shows the parameter estimates, means, and 
elasticities. The model was fit with gallons per mile, but the table also shows three 
alternative specifications of interest (all simple transformations of the coefficient on 
gallons per mile): grams of CO2-equivalent per mile, cents per mile, and miles per 
gallon. 
Parameters Means Elasticities Parameters Means Elasticities
Horsepower/Ton $311 104 1.27 $243 102 1.01
Curbweight (lb) $9.21 3697 1.34 $8.66 3774 1.32
Gallons per Mile ($254,691) 0.04 (0.41) ($258,358) 0.04 (0.43)
Grams CO2-eq/mile ($29.96) 344 (0.41) ($30.40) 349 (0.43)
Cents per Mile ($1,682) 6.12 (0.41) ($1,921) 5.53 (0.43)
Miles per Gallon $417 24.73 0.41 $436 24.33 0.43
R-Squared 55% 57%
Vehicle Price $25,429 $24,675
Gas Price (cents/gal) 151.4 134.5
California United States
Determinants of Retail Price: Hedonic Regressions
 
 
The hedonic regressions also included dummy variables for manufacturers. The table 
below uses the hedonic results to calculate a price premium for each manufacturer 
compared to GM. 
Calif. U.S.
DaimlerChrysler 17% 6%
Ford 11% 7%
GM 0% 0%
Honda 12% 4%
Nissan 5% -1%
Toyota 16% 10%
Other 28% 17%
Retail Price Premium by 
Manufacturer
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9 Appendix C: Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost 
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10 Appendix D: Alternative VMT Estimates 
In the text of the report we used CARB’s estimates of VMT to compute the change in 
total lifetime expenditure by consumers to purchase and fuel their vehicles. This 
appendix applies our own estimates of VMT that are smaller than CARB’s. Our estimates 
of  VMT by segment are: Car 144,286; Van 168,810; Pickup 169,096; and SUV 167,228. 
 
Scenario Car Van Pickup SUV Market
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($1,820) ($2,467) ($2,969) ($2,995) ($2,260)
Retail Price $1,253 $989 $1,367 $1,242 $1,275
Total Change ($567) ($1,478) ($1,602) ($1,753) ($985)
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($1,069) ($1,690) ($1,965) ($1,922) ($1,470)
Retail Price $536 $743 $959 $920 $658
Net Feebate ($652) $172 $1,187 $928 $0
Total Change ($1,185) ($776) $180 ($74) ($813)
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($1,707) ($2,598) ($3,050) ($3,019) ($2,295)
Retail Price $979 $1,270 $1,633 $1,516 $1,164
Net Feebate ($877) $235 $1,444 $1,353 $0
Total Change ($1,606) ($1,093) $27 ($151) ($1,131)
Lifetime Fuel Cost ($2,174) ($3,153) ($3,853) ($3,773) ($2,842)
Retail Price $2,618 $2,726 $3,514 $3,227 $2,866
Net Feebate ($541) $280 $966 $673 $0
Total Change ($97) ($147) $626 $126 $25
Feebates alone         
($36 per gram per mile)
Price of gasoline = $1.74/gallon
Lifetime Fuel Cost = present value at 5% discount of fuel saved assuming AAD life and VMT.
Retail Transaction Price = change in price from the retailer's point of view.
Net Feebate = impact of feebate on price from the consumer's point of view.
Change in Price and Lifetime Fuel Cost by Scenario
Pavley alone
Feebates alone         
($18 per gram per mile)
Pavley plus feebates 
($18)
Negative values represent reductions in consumer expenditure.
Total Change= the total change in consumer expenditure.
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11  Endnotes 
 
                                                
i Visit http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm for additional documents and 
information. 
ii The function estimated was 
! 
ln(Cost)i = a + b(g0 " g)i + ui  in which ln is the natural 
logarithmic function, i indexes rows in the CARB table, and u is the error term. 
iii We model the feebates as a shift upward of the MR curve. We could also have modeled 
the feebates as a shift downward in the MC curve. The important thing is that there is a 
difference between what the buyer pays and what the automaker receives. 
iv The UMTRI database is available upon request. 
v The appendix presents estimates of changes in consumer expenditures using alternative 
estimates of vehicle miles traveled. 
